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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 as this case 
was transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Utah Supreme Court on or about 
September 7, 2010. (R. 189-190).* 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Issue #1. According to Utah law, the entry of a Default and a Default 
Judgment are appropriate when a party has failed to timely plead and when the plaintiffs 
damages are supported by evidence. In this case, a Default was inappropriately entered 
because Appellant/Defendant, Benjamin Chavez ("Chavez") filed an Answer and because 
Appellee/Plaintiff, Ray Salazar's ("Salazar") damage claims are ambiguous and 
unsupported by evidence. When Chavez learned of the entry of the Default Judgment, he 
promptly filed a motion to have the Default Judgment set aside, thereby preserving the 
issue in the Trial Court. (R. 61-63). 
Standard of Review. Questions of whether the Court correctly interpreted and 
applied the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are questions of law, reviewed for correctness. 
See USA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp, 2010 UT 31, If 27, 235 P.3d 749. 
References to "R" refer to the pages of the original record, paginated pursuant to 
UtahR.App.P. 11(b). 
DMWEST #7992057 v9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Issue #2. According to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b), the Trial Court erred in its denial of 
Chavez's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment (the "Motion"). The issue of whether the 
Trial Court's ruling was proper was preserved when Chavez filed the Motion. (R. 61-
63). 
Standard of Review. Questions regarding whether or not the Trial Court erred in 
denying a Rule 60(b) motion are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. 
Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT App. 110, f 8, 2 P.3d 451. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE 
1. Utah R. Civ. P. 5(a)(2)(D) - See Addendum. 
2. Utah R. Civ. P. 7(a) - See Addendum. 
3. Utah R. Civ. P. 54(c)(2) - See Addendum. 
4. Utah R. Civ. P. 55 - See Addendum. 
5. Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(d) - See Addendum. 
6. Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) - See Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case stems from an altercation between Salazar and Chavez wherein Salazar 
alleges he sustained certain injuries resulting in medical expenses, lost income, and pain 
and suffering. Chavez contends that Salazar was the instigator of this altercation and 
argues that Salazar's medical bills were paid by Medicaid, that Salazar was unemployed, 
and that Salazar should reimburse Chavez for certain damages resulting from the 
altercation. 
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Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Trial Court 
Salazar filed a Complaint against Chavez on or about August 20, 2008. (R. 1-6). 
On or about September 23, 2008, Chavez filed an Answer. (R. 7). On August 11, 2009, 
the Trial Court dismissed the case because the parties failed to respond to the Trial 
Court's order to show cause why the case should not be dismissed. (R. 25-27). On 
August 26, 2009, the Trial Court reopened the case and entered a Default and a Default 
Judgment against Chavez claiming that Chavez had failed to file an Answer. (R. 51-57). 
On June 11, 2010, Chavez filed a Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment. (R. 61-63). 
The Court denied Chavez's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment in a Minute Entry on 
July 29, 2010. (R. 177-178). On August 30, 2010, Chavez filed his Notice of Appeal. 
(R. 180-181). On November 16, 2010, the Trial Court entered an Order stating that the 
July 29, 2010 Minute Entry Decision is and was a final, appealable Order. (R. 191-195). 
Statement of the Facts 
1. Salazar filed a Complaint against Chavez on or about August 20, 2008, (the 
"Complaint") alleging that he sustained injuries from a physical altercation with 
Appellant (the "Civil Case"). (R. 1-6). 
2. Salazar alleges that Chavez attempted to run him over in his truck and that Chavez 
cut Salazar's arm with a machete. (R. 1-6). 
3. Salazar sought "medical expenses in excess of $10,000.00 and continued medical 
expenses for rehabilitation," lost wages of $13.00 per hour or approximately $25,000.00 
per year and pain and discomfort in an unspecified amount, as well as court costs and 
other relief that the Trial Court deemed reasonable. (R. 1-6). 
DMWEST #7992057 v9 3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4. On September 23, 2008, Chavez, acting pro se, filed his Answer. (R. 7). 
5. In his Answer, Chavez stated that Salazar attacked Chavez, that Salazar threw a 
brick at Chavez's car, and that Salazar cut his own arm on a jagged edge of Chavez's 
vehicle. Chavez also argued that Salazar's medical bills were covered by Medicaid and 
that at the time of the altercation, Salazar was not employed. Chavez also sought 
reimbursement from Salazar for damages Salazar caused to Chavez's vehicle, for the cost 
of retrieving Chavez's truck from impound, and for Chavez's pain and suffering for the 
time Chavez spent incarcerated as a result of the altercation. (R. 7). 
6. In December, 2008, the State of Utah brought a criminal case against Chavez in 
connection with the altercation (the "Criminal Case"). Chavez was represented by Teresa 
Welch in the Criminal Case. (R. 115-118). 
7. Despite Chavez having filed his Answer in the Civil Case, Salazar, on January 5, 
2009, filed a Motion for Substituted Service of Process. (R. 8-10). 
8. Salazar's Motion for Substituted Service of Process was accompanied by the 
affidavit of Salazar's counsel, David K. Smith. (R. 11-18). 
9. Mr. Smith stated that "[t]he constable was unable to serve the Defendant at [his 
last known address, known to the Plaintiff, at 845 West Fayette Avenue, Salt Lake City, 
Utah]," and "the constable was told the Defendant had moved ...." (R. 12). 
10. On January 7, 2009, the Trial Court, in its Minute Entry, stated, "it appears that 
Defendant has actual knowledge of this lawsuit in as much as he filed an answer on 
September 23, 2008." The Trial Court then, inexplicably, authorized service by 
publication. (R. 19). 
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11. On July 9, 2009, the Trial Court issued an Order to Show Cause why the Civil 
Case should not be dismissed. (R. 25-26). 
12. On August 6, 2009, Chavez waived his right to a preliminary hearing in the 
Criminal Case pursuant to a proposed resolution by the Prosecutor. In fine tuning the 
details of the proposed resolution, Ms. Welch requested that the Prosecutor provide 
information regarding the amount of restitution sought. (R. 116). 
13. Several months passed before Ms. Welch heard back from the Prosecutor 
regarding restitution. (R. 116). 
14. In the Civil Case, a hearing date of August 10, 2009, was set for the parties to 
appear regarding the Trial Court's Order to Show Cause. (R. 25-26). 
15. Neither Chavez, Salazar, nor his counsel, Mr. Smith, appeared at the hearing 
before the Trial Court on August 10, 2009. (R. 27). 
16. On August 11, 2009, the Trial Court dismissed the Civil Case for failure to 
prosecute. (R. 25-27). 
17. On August 24, 2009, Salazar moved the Trial Court to reopen the Civil Case. (R. 
28-35). 
18. On that same day, August 24, 2009, Mr. Smith claims to have served, by mail, a 
proposed Default Certificate and a proposed Default Judgment. (R. 51-56). 
19. On August 25, 2009, the Trial Court signed the Default Judgment which was 
entered on August 26, 2009. (R. 51 -53). 
20. The Default Judgment awards Salazar $29,120, comprised of $6,000 for medical 
expenses, $3,120 for lost income, and $20,000 for pain and suffering. (R. 51-53). 
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21. On August 26, 2009, the Trial Court signed and entered the Default Certificate. 
(R. 54-56). 
22. The Trial Court stated that the Default Certificate was entered because "no answer 
or other pleading ha[d] been filed ...." (R. 54). 
23. However, on that same day, August 26, 2009, the Trial Court granted Salazar's 
Motion to Reopen the Case, citing Chavez's Answer as proof that the "[Servicemembers' 
Civil Relief Act] SCRA does not apply." (R. 57). 
24. In or about December 2009, Ms. Welch received an email from the Prosecutor 
notifying her that Default Judgment had been entered against Chavez in the amount of 
$29,120 in the Civil Case. This surprised Ms. Welch as she was unaware of any other 
pending legal proceedings against Chavez. (R. 116). 
25. In approximately January 2010, Ms. Welch inquired further regarding the Default 
Judgment during a telephone conversation with the Prosecutor. The Prosecutor informed 
Ms. Welch that Chavez's default had been entered in connection with the Civil Case, 
which Ms. Welch did not know existed. (R. 116). 
26. Ms. Welch attempted to contact Chavez to inform him of the Default Judgment. 
However, Ms. Welch was unable to contact Chavez as she had an incorrect telephone 
number for him. (R. 116). 
27. On approximately March 29, 2010, Ms. Welch spoke to Chavez and informed him 
of the Default Judgment. (R. 116). 
28. Chavez was not aware that the Default Judgment had been sought or entered 
against him until March 29, 2010 when Ms. Welch informed him of its entry. (R. 120). 
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29. When Chavez learned of the Default Judgment he sought counsel and retained the 
undersigned counsel on or about April 14, 2010. (R. 120). 
30. On June 7, 2010, in the Criminal Case, the Court held a sentencing hearing for 
Chavez. The sentencing hearing was to address, among other things, how much, if any, 
restitution Chavez owed. (R. 117; R. 120). 
31. Chavez desired a ruling regarding restitution in the Criminal Case prior to 
requesting that the Default Judgment be set aside in the Civil Case, so that any ruling in 
the Civil Case would not affect the Court's ruling in the Criminal Case. (R. 121). 
32. On June 11, 2010, Chavez filed a Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment (the 
"Motion to Set Aside"), a supporting memorandum, and the supporting declarations of 
Teresa Welch and Benjamin Chavez. (R. 61-121). 
33. On July 29, 2010, the Trial Court denied the Motion to Set Aside. (R. 177-178). 
34. The July 29, 2010, Minute Entry Decision states: 
[T]here is no explanation in the case record for why a default 
certificate and default judgment were signed given that the 
docket clearly showed that Defendant had filed an answer 
almost a year earlier. 
The fact that default judgment should not have been entered 
does not, however, warrant setting it aside under the facts of 
this case. 
(R. 177). 
35. On August 30, 2010, Chavez filed his Notice of Appeal. (R. 180-181). 
36. On November 16, 2010, the Trial Court entered an Order stating that the July 29, 
2010, Minute Entry Decision is and was a final, appealable Order. (R. 191-195). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The Trial Court erred in entering Default and Default Judgment against Chavez 
because Chavez filed a timely Answer in this matter. According to the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, an Answer is a pleading and its timely filing precludes the entry of 
Default and Default Judgment. 
The Trial Court further erred in its award of damages because the Complaint does 
not request a sum certain or a calculable sum certain and no evidence was offered or 
admitted supporting the damage award. According to Utah Law, such an award is 
reversible error regardless of the timeliness of an appellants prior motion. Utah R. Civ. 
P. 60(b). 
Because of the Trial Court's errors, Chavez filed a timely Motion to Set Aside the 
Default Judgment. The Court, however, denied the Motion citing Chavez's alleged 
failure to serve the Answer on opposing counsel and alleged failure to keep the Trial 
Court apprised of his current address. Chavez disputes the Court's findings and argues 
that, regardless of these findings, such minor procedural infractions do not warrant the 
sanction of a default judgment, especially against &pro se litigant who is afforded leeway 
on the Court's procedural rules. 
The Trial Court has admitted that the entry of Default and the Default Judgment 
were erroneous, even opining as to its confusion as to how such occurred given the 
obvious filing of Chavez's Answer. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, public policy, 
and equity all mandate the setting aside of the Default, and the vacating of the Default 
Judgment so that the matter can be remanded and heard on the merits. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING A DEFAULT CERTIFICATE 
AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST CHAVEZ. 
A. Chavez Filed An Answer, Thereby Precluding His Default. 
The Default and Default Judgment should not have been entered against Chavez 
because he timely plead by filing his Answer. See Utah R. Civ. P. 7(a). Rule 55 states: 
When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief 
is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided 
by these rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk shall 
enter the default of that party. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 55(a). Salazar filed the Complaint on August 20, 2008. (R. 1-6). On September 
23, 2008, Chavez filed his pro se Answer in this matter. (R. 7). 
Rule 55 only permits the clerk of the Trial Court to enter a party's default if said party 
failed to plead. Utah R. Civ. P. 55(a). Accordingly, the Trial Court's entry of Default and 
Default Judgment against Chavez was improper because Chavez filed a responsive pleading. In 
fact, the Trial Court readily admits that the Default Judgment was an error. The Court stated: 
[TJhere is no explanation in the case record for why a default 
certificate and default judgment were signed given that the 
docket clearly showed that Defendant had filed an answer 
almost a year earlier. 
(R. 177). 
The Utah Court of Appeals has held that the entry of Default is improper when an answer 
has been filed. In P & B Land, Inc. v. Klungervik, the defendant appealed the Trial Court's 
striking of his answer and entering default judgment against him. 751 P.2d 274, 276 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). The Utah Court of Appeals determined that the striking of the defendant's answer 
was improper and that, accordingly, the entry of partial default judgment against the defendant 
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was, likewise, improper. Id. at 277. The Court stated, "[t]he entry of a default judgment by a 
court with jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter, where there is no default in law or 
in fact, is regarded as improper or illegal, and voidable." Id. 
Likewise, in this case, because Chavez filed an Answer, the entry of the Default 
Judgment against him is improper, illegal, and should be voided. The Court should set aside the 
entry of Default, vacate the Default Judgment, and remand the case to be heard on its merits. 
B. The Trial Court's Damage Award Fails To Comply With Rules 54 and 55 
Of The Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure. 
The Trial Court erred in entering the Default and Default Judgment against Chavez 
because Salazar's Complaint requests speculative damages, and Salazar presented no evidence to 
prove or support his damage claims. Rule 54 states, "[a] judgment by default shall not be 
different in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the demand for 
judgment." Utah R. Civ. P. 54(c)(2). Furthermore, Rule 55 states as follows: 
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as 
follows: 
(b)(1) By the clerk. Upon request of the plaintiff the clerk 
shall enter judgment for the amount claimed and costs against 
the defendant if: 
* * * 
(b)(1)(D) the claim against the defendant is for a sum certain 
or for a sum that can be made certain by computation. 
(b)(2) By the court. In all other cases the party entitled to a 
judgment by default shall apply to the court therefore. If, in 
order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into 
effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine the 
amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment 
by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, 
the court may conduct such hearings or order such references 
as it deems necessary and proper. 
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A plaintiff cannot merely obtain a default judgment and an award for damages 
unsupported by evidence. Indeed, Utah courts have stated "it is [ ] incumbent upon the 
non-defaulting party to establish by competent evidence the amount of recoverable 
damages and costs he claims." Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 965 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). Additionally, "[t]o enter a default judgment for unliquidated damages, a 
judge must review the complaint, determine whether the allegations state a valid claim 
for relief, and award damages in an amount that is supported by some valid evidence" 
Lee v. Langley, 2005 UT App 339, \ 24 n. 4, 121 P.3d 33 (quoting Skanchy v. Calcados 
Ortope SA, 952 P.2d 1071, 1076 (Utah 1998) (emphasis added)). 
The Utah Supreme Court remanded a case, requiring that the Trial Court hold a 
hearing, where a plaintiff obtained default judgment, but the Trial Court did not take 
evidence regarding the reasonableness of the amount of damages. Specifically, in Larsen 
v. Collina, the plaintiff brought a paternity suit against the defendant and sought damages 
of $4,946.00 in unpaid child support and $183.00 per month in continuing support. See 
684 P.2d 52, 53-54 (Utah 1984). The plaintiff obtained a default judgment against the 
defendant as a sanction for the defendant's failure to answer interrogatories. Id. at 54. 
The Utah Supreme Court remanded the case for a hearing, stating that "[t]he amount of 
damages requested here was neither a sum certain nor a sum readily calculable, and the 
court did not take evidence as to the reasonableness of the amount." Id. at 56. 
Similarly, in Russell v. Martell, the plaintiff obtained a default judgment against 
one of the defendants and that defendant subsequently filed a motion to have the default 
judgment set aside. See 681 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Utah 1984). According to the plaintiff, the 
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defendant had acted as a securities agent without being registered and was guilty of 
violations of the Utah's Securities Act. Id. at 1195. The plaintiff was, according to the 
statute, entitled to the recovery of the consideration paid for the security. Id. Despite 
finding that the defendant had failed to timely bring a Rule 60(b)(1) motion, and finding 
that the defendant's claims did not meet section 60(b)(7),2 the Court reversed the 
judgment. Id. at 1196. The Court stated: 
[T]he judgment against [the defendant] must be reversed 
because of the failure of the Trial Court to follow Rule 
55(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 54(c)(2) 
and Rule 55 describes the procedure to be followed by Trial 
Courts in entering judgments against defaulting parties. 
Courts are not at liberty to deviate from those rules just 
because one party is in default and is not entitled to be heard 
on the merits of the case. For example, Rule 54(c)(2) 
provides that a judgment by default may not be different in 
kind from or exceed in amount that specifically prayed for in 
the demand for judgment. Another rule governing the entry 
of default judgment is Rule 55(b)(2), which is applicable in 
the instant case. It provides that when the plaintiff s claim is 
for other than a sum certain or an amount that by computation 
can be made certain judgment by default may not be entered 
by the clerk of the court, but must be entered by the court, 
which may conduct such hearings and take such evidence as 
is necessary to determine the damages . . . [T]he plaintiffs' 
claims for damages against [the defendant] were not for sums 
certain and under Rule 55(b)(1) a hearing should have been 
conducted by the trial court to ascertain the amount of the 
damages to which the plaintiffs were entitled. 
Id. at 1195. Further, the Court held that "evidence should have been adduced as to the 
amount of income, if any, the plaintiff had received on the security ... so that it could be 
deducted in the calculation of the plaintiffs' damages." Id. at 1195-96. 
Now Rule 60(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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In this case, Salazar's Complaint prays for the following damages: 
1. For damages for loss of income according to proof. 
2. For damages for medical expenses according to proof. 
3. For reasonable and necessary future medical expenses as 
may be shown at the time of trial. 
4. For loss of future earning capacity. 
5. For damages for permanent partial impairment sustained 
by the Plaintiff. 
6. For interest on any special damages at the legal rate from 
the date those expenses were incurred. 
7. For damages for pain and suffering. 
8. For costs of the Court. 
9. For such other and further relief as the court may appear 
just and reasonable in the premises. 
(R. 3-4). None of Salazar's damages are for "a sum certain or for a sum that can be made 
certain by computation." Utah R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1)(D). And, as admitted in the 
Complaint, Salazar is required to introduce evidence to support his damage claims. As 
the Record clearly manifests, Salazar has failed to provide any evidence to support his 
medical expenses, lost wages, and/or his pain and suffering. Additionally, Chavez has 
incorrectly been precluded from presenting evidence of payments offsetting Salazar's 
claims. Accordingly, the Trial Court's damage award to Salazar is in err and should be 
vacated.3 
As discussed below, the Court should set aside the Default Judgment regardless of 
the Court's decision regarding Chavez's Rule 60(b) motion. See Russell v. Martell, 681 
P.2d 1193, 1195-96 (Utah 1984). 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING CHAVEZ'S MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT. 
Because the Default Judgment was incorrectly entered against Chavez, the Trial 
Court's subsequent denial of Chavez's Motion to Set Aside was likewise, improper and 
in error. Rule 60 provides: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in 
the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment... for the following 
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due 
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for 
a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud,. . . misrepresentation 
or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is 
void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or 
discharged . . . (6) any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). 
The rule further states that motions predicated on subdivision (6) shall "be made 
within a reasonable time." Id. Utah courts have held that the "any other reason justifying 
relief subdivision embodies three requirements: First, that the reason be one other than 
those listed in Subdivisions (1) through (5); second that the reason justify relief; and 
third, that the motion be made within a reasonable time. Richins v. Delbert Chipman & 
Sons, Inc., 817 P.2d 382, 387 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Laub v. South Cent. Utah 
Tel Ass'n., 657 P.2d 1304, 1306-07 (Utah 1982)). Additionally, u[a]n 'entry of default' 
may be set aside under rule 55(c) 'for good cause shown by the court.'" Calder Bros. Co. 
v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 926 n.4 (Utah 1982) (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 55). Because 
Mr. Chavez has met the requirements above, there was good cause to set aside the 
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Default. Further, public policy favors setting aside default judgments. See Heathman v. 
Fabian & Clendenin, 311 P.2d 189, 190 (Utah 1962) ("Judgments by default are not 
favored by the courts nor are they in the interest of justice and fair play .... The courts, in 
the interest of justice and fair play, favor, where possible, a foil and complete opportunity 
for a hearing on the merits of every case.") Accordingly, the Trial Court erred in not 
granting the Motion to Set Aside. 
First, the basis for the Motion to Set Aside was unique and distinct from the 
reasons articulated in subdivisions (1) through (5) of Rule 60(b) and there was 
justification for the relief sought. Default should not have been entered in this matter 
because Chavez submitted a pro se Answer to the Complaint. (R. 7; R. 120). The Trial 
Court even acknowledged Chavez's Answer in its January 7, 2009 Minute Entry as well 
as its August 2, 2010 Minute Entry. (R. 19 ("[I]t appears Defendant has actual 
knowledge of this lawsuit in as much as he filed an answer on September 23, 2008."); 
R. 177 ("[T]he docket clearly showed that Defendant had filed an answer almost a year 
earlier.")). Nonetheless, the Court entered Default Judgment and signed the Default 
Certificate against Chavez, incorrectly stating that more than 30 days had elapsed since 
the date of the last publication and no answer or other pleading had been filed. (R. 51-
56). The Default Judgment awarded Salazar $29,120.00, comprised of $6,000.00 for 
medical expenses, $3,120.00 for lost income and $20,000.00 for pain and suffering. (R. 
51-53). Simply put, this entry of Default is incorrect and the Court should set it aside. 
Second, the Motion to Set Aside was made within a reasonable time under Rule 
60. Utah courts have held that a motion filed within about one month after learning that 
DMWEST #7992057 v9 15 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
judgment was entered was timely under Rule 60(b). Workman v. Nagle Constr., Inc., 802 
P.2d 749, 752 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Moreover, when determining notice of judgment, 
the Court looks at when the party actually discovers the default. See, e.g., Workman, 802 
P.2d at 752; U.S. Bank NA. v. Mallory, 982 A.2d 986, 995 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009). Mr. 
Chavez did not receive "actual" notice until March 29, 2010. (R. 120). 
Indeed, Chavez's attorney in the Criminal Case, Ms. Welch, did not learn about 
the entry of Default Judgment in the Civil Case until January 2010, when Ms. Welch 
spoke to the Prosecutor. (R. 116). Ms. Welch then attempted to get a hold of Chavez, 
but could not reach him due to an incorrect telephone number on file. (R. 116). It was 
not until March 29, 2010 that Ms. Welch spoke with Chavez and informed him that 
Default had been entered against him in the Civil Case. (R. 116). Prior to that date, 
Chavez had no idea that Default Judgment had been entered, or even requested for that 
matter. (R. 117). After learning about the entry of Default, Chavez promptly engaged 
undersigned counsel on or about April 14, 2010. (R. 117).4 Because Chavez did not 
learn about the entry of Default until March 29, 2010, and due to the sentencing hearing 
Additionally, intervening circumstances in the Criminal Case prevented Chavez 
from filing the Motion to Set Aside until June 11, 2010. Specifically, the Motion to Set 
Aside was not filed until after the Criminal Case Court held the sentencing hearing on 
June 7, 2010, because that hearing addressed the specific issue of whether Chavez would 
be ordered to pay restitution, and, if so, how much. (R. 117; R. 120-21).) The restitution 
at issue in the Criminal Case is identical to the damages sought by Salazar in the Civil 
Case, which were awarded by the Default Judgment. (R. 117; R. 121; see also, R. 51-
53). Chavez desired a ruling regarding restitution in the Criminal Case prior to 
requesting that the Default Judgment be set aside in the Civil Case, so that the Civil Case 
would not affect the Court's ruling in the Criminal Case. (R. 121). 
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in the Criminal Case, which addressed how much restitution Chavez would be ordered to 
pay, Chavez could neither respond to the request for Default nor file the Motion to Set 
Aside until June 11, 2010. (R. 117; R. 120-21). Certainly, where the Utah Supreme 
Court has determined that a motion filed one month after learning about the entry of 
default was reasonable, the Motion to Set Aside, filed just over two months after learning 
about entry of default, is reasonable. This is particularly true where intervening 
circumstances in the Criminal Case prevented Chavez from filing the Motion to Set 
Aside until after the sentencing hearing, and in light of the strong public policy in favor 
of setting aside default judgment. 
The timeliness of Chavez's filing of the Motion to Set Aside is likewise 
reasonable given Salazar's failure to comply with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 5 requires that Chavez be served with "notice of entry of judgment...." Utah R. 
Civ. P. 5(a)(2)(D). As is clear from the record, Salazar failed to serve Chavez with notice 
of the entry of the Default Judgment. There is no certificate, proof, or affidavit of service 
showing Salazar served Chavez with notice of the Default Judgment having been 
entered. Accordingly, it is not surprising that Chavez was unaware of the entry of the 
Default Judgment. 
Ultimately, however, even if the Court finds that Chavez's Motion to Set Aside 
was untimely, according to Utah Law, the Court must set aside the Default Judgment 
5
 Chavez recognizes the inclusion of a certificate of service on the Default and the 
Default Judgment, however, such certificates pre-dates the Trial Court's signature and 
merely evidences service of the proposed Default and the proposed Default Judgment. 
DMWEST #7992057 v9 17 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
because the Default and the Default Judgment were incorrectly entered given Chavez 
filed an Answer and because the Default Judgment is not supported by evidence. See 
Martell 6&1?.2d at 1195-96. 
Finally, as a matter of public policy, the Trial Court should have set aside the 
Default. "Judgments by default are not favored by the courts nor are they in the interest 
of justice and fair play.. .The courts, in the interest of justice and fair play, favor, where 
possible, a full and complete opportunity for a hearing on the merits of every case." 
Heathman, 377 P.2d at 190 (affirming that a default judgment can be set aside on the 
grounds of excusable neglect). In fact, "courts generally tend to favor granting relief 
from default judgments where there is any reasonable excuse, unless it will result in 
substantial prejudice or injustice to the adverse party." Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. 
Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975). See also, Wright v. 
Wright, 941 P.2d 646, 649 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (the law disfavors default judgments). 
In the instant case, the interest of justice is met because Salazar will not be 
prejudiced by setting aside the Default Judgment. Nothing has happened between the 
time Default Judgment was entered and now that would cause prejudice to Salazar. To 
the contrary, Chavez will suffer great prejudice from the entry of Default and the Default 
Judgment if they are not set aside because Chavez had no opportunity to contest Salazar's 
specious claims and damages and is now saddled with a $29,120.00 judgment. The 
interests of justice favor setting aside the Default and the Default Judgment so that the 
$29,120.00 judgment may be disputed and adjudicated on the merits rather than disposed 
of by Default. There is simply no basis for the exorbitant damages claim awarded to 
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Salazar by Default; Salazar's medical expenses were likely covered by Medicaid and 
since Salazar was unemployed for several months prior to the altercation, he has suffered 
no lost wages. Additionally, the award Salazar received for pain and suffering is flagrant 
given the lack of evidence of any such pain and suffering, the factual dispute over the 
events of the altercation and the relatively minor injury sustained. Thus, because Chavez 
met the requirements of Rule 60(b) for setting aside the Default and the Default Judgment 
and in the interest of justice, the Court should set aside the Default, vacate the Default 
Judgment, and remand the Civil Case for an adjudication on the merits. 
The Trial Court's July 29, 2010 Minute Entry Decision justifies the denial of 
Chavez's Motion to Set Aside by stating: 
Still the defendant (a) did not serve his answer on opposing 
counsel, as required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
(b) did not include any contact information that would allow 
the Court (and opposing counsel) the ability to get in touch 
with him so prosecution of this case could proceed in a timely 
and appropriate way; and (c) never attempted to inform the 
Court of his whereabouts or inquire about the status of the 
case in the nearly two years since he filed his answer. Any 
person who is a party to an action in court has a duty to keep 
the Court informed of his whereabouts; this is something that 
Defendant utterly failed to do. As a result, defendant bears 
significant responsibility for perpetuating the Court's error. 
(R. 177-178 (emphasis added.)). Notably, the Court admits its error, but places the blame 
on Chavez for its error. Additionally, the Court's findings, are not supported by evidence 
and are, accordingly, an abuse of discretion. 
The Trial Court concluded that Chavez "did not serve his answer on opposing 
counsel, as required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." (R. 177). However, there is 
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absolutely no evidence to support this conclusion. In fact, as the Court notes, 
"Defendant's 'answer' was addressed to both the Court and Mr. Smith, Plaintiffs 
counsel." (R. 177). Accordingly, the only available evidence supports the opposite 
conclusion, that Chavez served his Answer on opposing counsel. (R. 7).6 
One might infer from Salazar's filing his Motion for Substituted Service that 
Salazar's counsel, Mr. Smith, had not been served with Chavez's Answer. However, that 
is only one explanation. It is equally as likely that Mr. Smith was served and merely 
misplaced, disregarded, etc., the Answer. There is simply no evidence upon which the 
Trial Court can base its finding that Chavez failed to serve the Answer on opposing 
counsel. 
There is nothing in the record that would lead Chavez to believe that the Trial 
Court was without his address. There is no evidence that the Trial Court requested 
Chavez provide an address. Salazar filed the Complaint on August 20, 2008. (R. 1-6). 
Salazar hired a constable to serve a copy of the Complaint and a Summons on Chavez. 
(R. 11-18). Chavez received the Complaint and filed his Answer. (R. 7). Having 
Chavez admits that certain procedural mistakes were made regarding the service 
of his Answer, namely the omission of a standard certificate of seirvice. However, pro se 
litigants should be "accorded every consideration that may reasonably be indulged," and 
the Trial Court should be loath to sanction Chavez for a procedural misstep here or there. 
Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 UT 11, H 3, 67 P.3d 1000 (citations omitted). This omission 
hardly justifies the sanction of a default judgment. 
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received the Complaint, Chavez had no reason to believe that either Salazar, Mr. Smith, 
or the Trial Court was without his address. 
The Trial Court, while admitting it erred, attempts to place the blame for the 
mistake on Chavez. Chavez was a pro se litigant who is entitled to leniency by the courts 
when it comes to matters of procedure. See Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 UT 11, \ 3, 67 P.3d 
1000, 1003 (Utah 2003). The Trial Court, on the other hand, has vast amounts of legal 
training and experience - blaming Chavez for the Court's error is inappropriate. It's 
important to note, absent the Trial Court's error, there would be nothing for Chavez's 
inexperience to perpetuate. 
Additionally, none of the Court's averments, even assuming such were true, 
warrant such a harsh sanction as the entry of a Default Judgment. The Court points to 
Chavez's alleged failure to serve the Answer on opposing counsel and his alleged failure 
to provide the Court with his address. '"[T]he law disfavors default judgments[.]"' 
Davis v. Goldsworthy, 2008 UT App 145, f 10, 184 P.3d 626 (quoting Black's Title, Inc. 
v. Utah State Ins. Dep't, 1999 UT App 330, If 5, 991 P.2d 607; citing Harrington v. 
Wade, 812 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("[DJefault judgment is an unusually 
harsh sanction that should be meted out with caution[.]")); Wright, 941 P.2d at 649. This 
is especially true when the party against whom such a harsh sanction is assessed is a 
pro se litigant. See Lundahl, 2003 UT 11, \ 3. 
7
 Additionally, Chavez mailed the Answer to the Court. The Court could have 
obtained Chavez's contact information from the return address on the envelope if 
necessary. 
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Combining the leniency afforded a pro se litigant, the strong presumption against 
defaults and default judgments, the Trial Court's errors, and the minority of Chavez's 
alleged mistakes, it becomes clear that the sanction of default and default judgment are 
too severe for the circumstances. Accordingly, the Court should set aside the Default, 
vacate the Default Judgment, and remand this matter for a determination on the merits. 
CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the Trial Court had no basis to enter the Default and/or the Default 
Judgment. The Trial Court's denial of Chavez's Motion to Set Aside was, likewise, in 
error. Accordingly, the entry of the Default should be set aside, the Default Judgment 
should be vacated, and the Court should remand this matter for adjudication on the merits 
of the parties' claims. 
DATED this 20th day of January 2011. 
Jaspn D. Boreh; Esc 
Melanie J. Vartabedian, Esq. 
Quinton J. Stephens, Esq. 
BALLARD SPAHR LLP 
Attorneys for Appellant and Defendant 
Benjamin Chavez 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct of copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT BENJAMIN CHAVEZ was served to the following this 20th day of 
January 2011, in the manner set forth below: 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Federal Express 
[ ] Certified Mail, Receipt No. , return receipt requested 
David K. Smith, Esq. 
6925 Union Park Center, #600 
Midvale,UT 84047 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RAY SALAZAR, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
BENJAMIN CHAVEZ, 
and JOHN DOES I-V, inclusive, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
David K. Smith (#2993) 
6925 Union Park Center, #600 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 566-3373 
Facsimile: (801) 566-8763 
Attorney for Appellee, Ray Salazar 
ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT BENJAMIN CHAVEZ 
Case No.: 20100722 
District Court No.: 080917245 
Jason D. Boren (#7816) 
Melanie J. Vartabedian (#10148) 
Quinton J. Stephens (#12675) 
Ballard Spahr LLP 
One Utah Center, Suite 600 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -2221 
Telephone: (801-531-3000 
Facsimile: (801)531-3001 
Attorneys for Appellant, Benjamin Chavez 
APPEAL FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTERED BY THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, HONORABLE DENISE P. LINDBERG, ON JULY 29, 2010. 
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Utah R. Civ. P. 5(a)(2)(D) 
[A] party in default for any reason shall be served with notice of entry of 
judgment under Rule 58A(d), 
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(a) 
Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a counterclaim; 
an answer to a cross claim, if the answer contains a cross claim; a third party 
complaint, if a person who was not an original party is summoned under the 
provisions of Rule 14; and a third party answer, if a third party complaint is 
served. No other pleading shall be allowed, except that the court may order a 
reply to an answer or a third party answer. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(c)(2) 
Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from, 
or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the demand for judgment. 
UtahR. Civ. P. 55 
Default. 
(a) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for eiffirmative relief is sought 
has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is 
made to appear the clerk shall enter the default of that party. 
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows: 
(b)(1) By the clerk. Upon request of the plaintiff the clerk shall enter judgment 
for the amount claimed and costs against the defendant if: 
(b)(1)(A) the default of the defendant is for failure to appear ; 
(b)(1)(B) the defendant is not an infant or incompetent person; 
(b)(1)(C) the defendant has been personally served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1); and 
(b)(1)(D) the claim against the defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum that 
can be made certain by computation. 
(b)(2) By the court. In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by default 
shall apply to the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment 
or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine the 
amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to 
make an investigation of any other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or 
order such references as it deems necessary and proper. 
(c) Setting aside default For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry 
of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside 
in accordarjce with Rule 60(b). 
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The provisions of this rule 
apply whether the party entitled to the judgment by default is a plaintiff, a third-
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party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all 
cases a judgment by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c). 
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency thereof No judgment by 
default shall be entered against the state of Utah or against an officer or agency 
thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence 
satisfactory to the court. 
5. Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(d) 
Notice of judgment. A copy of the signed judgment shall be promptly served by 
the party preparing it in the manner provided in Rule 5. The time for filing a 
notice of appeal is not affected by this requirement. 
6. Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) 
Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could 
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) 
fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation 
or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the 
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon 
which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer 
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other 
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be 
made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion 
under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its 
operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an 
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to 
set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any 
relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an 
independent action. 
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Chavez's Answer 
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September 22, 2008 
To: Third Judicial District Court And David K. Smith esq. 
Re: Civil #080917245 
By. 
PiiiBBmm^i mum 
I mrd Judicial District 
A SEP 23 2008 
J j ( ^LT LAKE COUNTY 
deputy Clerk 
My name is Benjamin J. Chavez and I am writing this in rebuttal of accused petition. 
First of all I am disabled and unable to work, I am 52 years of age and suffered multiple 
strokes in the year of 2007,1 am currently seeking social security benefits for relief of 
my misfortune. Regarding the incident on July 3, 2008 , Mr. Salazar attacked me and my 
vehicle with a brick, apparently he had cut his arm on my door lock. According to 
witnesses involved, they had never seen me with a weapon of any kind. Mr. Salazar's 
medical bills were covered by Medicaid. Mr. Salazar was not working during the time 
nor had he worked all summer. He was simply ripping off all friends and or 
acquaintances to support his drug and alcohol habit. I have several reputable witnesses to 
testify to his actions that evening and to his dishonorable character. I would in turn like to 
charge him with the damages incurred to my vehicle, the cost of retreiving my truck from 
impound and the personal hardship I encountered of having to spend 8 days in jail. As I 
said I do have 4 personal witnesses available and are willing to testify against Mr. Salazar 
Sincerely: Benjamin J. Chavez 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Judge Lindberghs Minute Entry of July 29, 2010 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
H U B DISTRICT COURT* 
Third Judicial District 
M S -2 2010 
RAY SALA2AR, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
vs. 
BENJAMIN CHAVEZ, 
Defendant. 
SALT LAJ 
MINUTE ENTRY IfBGICIOM 111 
V Oept 
Deputy Clerk 
Case No: 080917245 
Judge: DENISE P. LINDBERG 
Date: July 29, 2010 
Before the Court is Defendant's motion to set aside default 
judgment. For the reasons stated below, the motion is DENIED, 
This action was initiated by Plaintiff on August 20, 2008. Summons 
and Complaint were placed with a constable for service, but the 
constable was unable to effect personal service because he was 
informed by defendantfs mother that defendant had "moved"; 
defendantfs mother refused to provide additional information. See 
Constable's Affidavit of Non-Service, attached as exhibit to 
Plaintiff's motion for substituted [sic] service. Regardless of 
the failed attempt at personal service, the Court's docket and 
case file show that on September 23, 2008 Defendant filed a brief, 
pro se "answer" refuting Plaintiff's allegations. 
By filing his "answer" Defendant submitted himself to the Court's 
personal jurisdiction. 
Defendant's "answer" was addressed to both the Court and Mr. Smith, 
Plaintiff's;counsel. However, it appears that the defendant never 
provided Mr. Smith with his answer. As a result, plaintiff and his 
counsel remained unaware that an answer had been filed with the 
Court. Plaintiff then filed his request for alternate service. 
It's unclear why the Court granted the request for "substituted 
service" given that the docket reflected that an answer had been 
filed. Regardless of the reason, however, the Court did approve 
the motion to serve by publication and Plaintiff duly gave such 
notice by publication in the Intermountain Commercial Record. Not 
unexpectedly, Defendant did not respond to the notice by 
publication. Accordingly, on August 26, 2009 Plaintiff moved for, 
and was granted, default judgment against Defendant. Again, 
there is no explanation in the case record for why a default 
certificate and default judgment were signed given that the docket 
clearly showed that Defendant had filed an answer almost a year 
earlier. 
The fact that default judgment should not have been entered does 
not, however, warrant setting it aside under the facts of this 
case. By haying filed his answer in September 2008 Defendant was 
on notice that there was a civil action against him in this Court. 
Still the defendant (a) did not serve his answer on opposing 
counsel, as required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; (b) did 
not include any contact information that would allow the Court 
(and opposing counsel) the ability to get in touch with him so 
prosecution of this case could proceed in a timely and appropriate 
way; and (c) never attempted to inform the Court of his 
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Case No: 080917245 Date: Jul 29, 2010 
whereabouts or inquire about the status of the case in the nearly 
two years since he filed his answer. Any person who is a party to 
an action in court has a duty to keep the Court informed of his 
whereabouts; this is something that Defendant utterly failed to 
do. As a result, defendant bears significant responsibility for 4 
perpetuating the Court's error. 
Finally, defendant argues that he did not become aware of the 
default judgment against him until March 29, 2010 when his criminal 
defense counsel informed him of the judgment. However, defendant 
acknowledges that once he was informed that there was a judgment 
against himv- he failed to seek immediate relief from that judgment. 
Instead, he chose to wait almost three full months until his 
criminal case was resolved. Defendant should have brought to the 
criminal Court's attention that a judgment already existed against 
him in a related civil case. Defendant's decision not to do so was 
based on strategic considerations in the crimincil case. However, 
those considerations do not constitute "excusable neglect" under 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). Furthermore, because Defendant was on 
actual notice that there was an open civil case against him but 
chose not to stay in contact with the Court, Defendant has failed 
to persuade the Court that the judgment against him should be set 
aside under R. 60(b)(6) (in the interest of jus] 
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Cite as 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984) 
and the Supreme Court will reverse that 
David RUSSELL and Eileen Russell, ruling only if it is clear that the trial court 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, abused its discretion. Rules Civ.Proc, 
v Rule 60(b). 
Sterling B. MARTELL, dba Martell Hold-
ing Company, Grant C. Mills, et al., 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 18160. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 30, 1984. 
Defendant sought reversal of an order 
by the Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, G. Hal Taylor, J., denying defend-
ant's motion to set aside a default judg-
ment which had been entered against him. 
The Supreme Court, Howe, J., held that: 
(1) even assuming that subparagraph of 
the Rule of Civil Procedure providing for 
relief from judgment for "(7) any other 
reason justifying relief from the operation 
of the judgment" was available to defend-
ant, his undenied statements that he felt no 
legal obligation to respond to plaintiffs' 
claims supported the trial court's denial of 
defendant's motion to set $side the default 
judgment entered against him; those state-
ments of defendant evinced a complete in-
difference ]by him and negated any dili-
gence on His part in pursuing the opportu-
nity to defend, but (2) the default judgment 
h;ad to be reversed because of the trial 
court's failure to follow the applicable Rule 
of Civil Procedure providing that, when 
plaintiffs' claim is for other than a sum 
certain or an amount that by cornputetion 
can be made certain, judgment by default 
may not be entered by the clerk of court 
but must be ehtered by the court, which 
rnay conduct such hearings and tike such 
evidence as is necessary to determine the 
damages. 
Affirmed in part; reversed and re-
nianded in part. 
1. Appeal and Error <s=*982(l) 
Judgment <§=3344 
Btoad discretion is accorded the trial 
court in ruling on relief from a judgment, 
2. Judgment <s=>345 
Subparagraph 7 of the civil procedure 
rule providing for relief from judgment for 
"any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment" may not be 
resorted to when the ground asserted for 
relief falls within subparagraph 1, allowing 
relief on the basis of "mistake, indvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect"; otherwise, 
the three-month limitation imposed oh re-
lief under subparagraph 1 would be avert-
ed. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 60(b)(l, 7). 
3. Judgment <®=*138(2) 
Even assuming that subparagraph of 
the Rule of Civil Procedure providing for 
relief from judgment for "(7). any other 
reason justifying relief from the operation 
of the judgment" was available to defend-
ant, his undenied statements that he felt no 
legal obligation to respond to plaintiffs' 
claims supported the trial court's denial of 
defendant's motion to set aside the default 
judgment entered against him; those state-
ments of defendant evinced a complete in-
difference by him and negated any dili-
gence oh his part in pursuing the opportu-
nity to defend. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 
60(b)(7). 
4. Attorney and Client <s^ >77 
Any neglect by defendant's attorney 
was attributable to defendant through prin-
ciples of agency. 
5. Judgment <3P131 
Default judgment entered against de-
fendant had to be reversed because of the 
trial court's failure to follow the applicable 
Rule of Civil Procedure providing that, 
when plaintiffs' claim is for other than a 
sum certain or an amount that by computa-
tion can be made certain, judgment by de-
fault may not be entered by the clerk of 
court but must be entered by the court, 
which may conduct such hearings and take 
such evidence as is necessary to determine 
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the damages. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 
55(b)(2); U.C.A. 1953, 61-l-22(l)(b). 
6. Judgment <s=>131 
Courts are not at liberty to deviate 
from the Rules of Civil Procedure govern-
ing entry of judgment against a defaulting 
party just because one party is in default 
and is not entitled to be heard on the merits 
of the case. 
Ralph J. Marsh, David B. Boyce, Salt 
Lake City, for defendants and appellants. 
Earl D. Tanner, David Eccles Hardy, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiffs and respondents. 
HOWE, Justice: 
Appellant Grant C. Mills seeks the rever-
sal of the trial court's denial of his motion 
to set aside a default judgment which had 
been entered against him. 
Oh July 7, 1981 Mills was served with a 
summons and a copy of the plaintiffs' com-
plaint. When he did not file an answer in 
response, his default was entered by the 
court. After an ex parte hearing on a 
motion made by plaintiffs for judgment, 
judgment was granti&i for $63,200, attor-
ney's fees of $5,000 and costs, of the action. 
In December of 1981 Mills filed a motion to 
set aside the default judgment supported 
by affidavits. Plaintiffs, David Russell 
and Eileen Russell, also filed affidavits in 
opposition to the motion. 
In his affidavit, Mills claimed to have 
sent Ms summons and copy of the com-
plaint to his attorney to be handled by him. 
He was located in another city and was 
also representing other co-defendants in 
this case. The attorney, because of confu-
sion in his office, failed to file an answer in 
Mills' behalf. After a writ of execution 
was issued against his property in Novem-
ber, Mills retained another attorney who 
filed the motion to set aside the judgment. 
Mills claimed that he had not taken action 
more quickly because he had relied upon 
representations of the clerk of the court 
who he telephoned that no judgment had 
been entered against him. 
On the other hand, Mr. Russell swore 
that on July 15 Mills informed him that he 
intended to take no action on the summons 
and complaint. In an affidavit by Russell's 
attorney, he stated that on August 18 he 
informed Mills in a telephone conversation 
that a default judgment had been taken 
against him. Mills replied that he felt no 
legal obligation to Russell and did not feel 
motivated by the lawsuit to address Rus-
sell's claims. Neither of these statements 
was denied by Mills. 
Upon review of the affidavits, the trial 
court denied Mills' motion to set aside the 
judgment, An order to stay the execution 
of Mills' property pending this appeal was 
entered thereafter. 
I. 
Mills' first point is that the trial court 
abused its discretion in refusing to set 
aside the default judgment. Rule 60(b) of 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which pro-
vides for relief from a judgment, states in 
pertinent part: 
On motion and upon such terms as are 
just, the dourt may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve^ a party or his legal repre-
sentative frohV a filial judgment, order, 
or proceeding for the following reasons: 
(1) mistake, inadvertaitee, surprise, or ex-
cusable neglect; 
. . . or (7) any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the judg-
ment. The motion shall be made within 
a reasonable time and for [reason] (1) . . . 
not more than three months after the 
judgment, order, or proceeding was en-
tered or taken. 
Mills claims that the circumstances here do 
not fall within subparagraph (1), with 
whose three month time limitation he did 
not comply. Rather, he argues, the judg-
ment should have been set aside under 
subparagraph (7) since despite his diligence 
he failed to timely answer the complaint. 
[1] Broad discretion is accorded the tri-
al court in ruling on relief from a judg-
ment; and, this Court will reverse that 
ruling only if it is clear the trial court 
abused its discretion. Valley Leasing v. 
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Houghton, Utah, 661 P.2d 
Heath v. Mower, Utah, 597 R2d 855 (1979); 
Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 
Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429 (1973). 
[2] We have held that subparagraph 7 
may not be resorted to for relief when the 
ground asserted for relief falls within sub-
paragraph 1. Pitts v. McLachlan, Utah, 
567 P.2d 171 (1977); Calder Bros. Co. v. 
Anderson, Utah, 652 P.2d 922 (1982); 
Laub v. South Central Telephone Ass'n, 
Utah, 657 P.2d 1304 (1982); Gardiner & 
Gardiner Builders v. Swapp, Utah, 656 
P.2d 429 (1982). Otherwise, the three 
month limitation imposed on relief under 
subparagraph 1 is averted. 
[3,4] However, even assuming that 
subparagraph 7 is available to Mills, his 
undenied statements that he felt no legal 
obligation to respond to the plaintiffs' 
claims support the trial court's denial of his 
motion. Those statements evince a com-
plete indifference by him and negate any 
diligence on his part in pursuing the oppor-
tunity to defend. Further, any neglect by 
Mills' attorney is attributable to Mills 
through principles of agency. Gardiner & 
Gardiner Builders v. Swapp, supra. We 
find under these facts hd abuse of discre-
tion^  by the trial court in denying relief 
froni the judgment; 
II. . . . . . ,V , .Y . 
[5,6] Although we will not disturb the 
default of Mills, we, dp hold under the au-
thority of Pitts v. Pine Meadow Ranch, 
Jnc.,Vtah,m^^ 
Enterprises, Inc. v. $a,ef, Utah, 604 VM 
486 (1979), that the judgment against Mills 
must be reversed because of the failure of 
the trial court to follow Rule 55(b)(2) of the 
tftah Rules of Ciyil Procedure. Rule 
S4(c)(2) and Rule 55 prescribes the proce-
dure to be followed by trial courts in enter-
ing judgments against defaulting parties. 
Courts are not at liberty to deviate from 
those rules just because one party is in 
default and is not entitled to be heard on 
the merits of the case. For example. Rule 
54(c)(2)/ provides that a judgment by default 
may not be different in kind from or exceed 
RUSSELL v. MARTELL Utah - H 9 5 
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959 (1983); in amount that specifically prayed for in 
the demand for judgment. See Hayes v. 
Towles, 95 Idaho 208, 506 P.2d 105 (1973). 
Another rule governing the entry of de-
fault judgments is Rule 55(b)(2), which is 
applicable in the instant case. It provides 
that when the plaintiffs claim is fpr other 
than a sum certain or an amount that by 
computation can be made certain judgment 
by default may not be entered by the clerk 
of the court, but must be entered by the 
court, which may conduct such hearings 
and take such evidence as is necessary to 
determine the damages. In the instant 
case, plaintiffs seek damages under U.C.A., 
1953, § 61-l-22(l)(b), part of the Utah Uni-
form Securities Act, which provides that an 
aggrieved party may 
[R]ecover the consideration paid for the 
security, together with interest at 8% per 
year from the date of payment, co^ts, 
and reasonable attorney's fees, less the 
amount of any income received on the 
security, upon the tender of the security 
or for damages if he no longer owns the 
security. 
According to the plaintiffs' complaint, Mills 
acted as a securities agent without having 
been registered, and he made untrue repre-
sentations to the plaintiffs concerning the 
security pledged to. secure the note in viola-
tion of our Securities Act. The promissory 
note that he sold the plaintiffs was for 
$48,000 principal. It was due in six months 
at which time $7,200 in interest would ac-
crue, making a total of $55,200 due. How-
ever, it is not alleged in the complaint that 
$48,000 was paid for the note and under 
the statute plaintiffs are limited to the re-
covery of the consideration paid for the 
security. That being the case, the plain-
tiffs' claims for damages against Mills 
were not for sums certain and under Rule 
55(b)(2) a hearing should have been con-
ducted by the trial court to ascertain the 
amount of the damages to which the plain-
tiffs were entitled. Furthermore,' under 
§ 61-l~22(l)(b), evidence should have been 
adduced as to the amount of income, if any, 
the plaintiffs had received on the security 
(which Mills claims was ^ $16,800) so that it 
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could be deducted in the calculation of the 
plaintiffs' damages. Although it appears 
that a hearing was held, it dealt only with 
the reasonableness of the attorney's fees to 
be awarded the plaintiffs. 
The judgment below is reversed on this 
point, and the case is remanded to the trial 
court for further proceedings in conformity 
with this opinion. No costs on appeal are 
awarded. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, OAKS and 
DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
GARKANE POWER ASSOCIATION, a 
Rural Electric Cooperative, plaintiff, 
v. 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, Miily O. Bernard, David R. Ir-
vine and Brent H. Cameron, Commis-
sioners of the Public Service Commis-
sion of Utah, Division of Public Utili-
ties and CP National, Defendants. 
No. 17461. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 11, 1984. 
Cooperative association, which made 
wholesale sales of electric power to public 
utility, sought writ of review of a report 
and order of the Public Service Commission 
requiring that cooperative association re-
fund money received from the wholesale 
sales. The Supreme Court held that: (1) 
Public Service Commission had jurisdiction 
over the parties in the case, and (2) Com-
mission did not exceed its statutory author-
ity in ordering a refund or in finding that 
the -4 contracts between cooperative associa-
tion and public utility adopted as the eon-
tract rates for the wholesale sales of elec-
tric power the Utah public and light rate 
schedules in effect from time to time as 
determined by the Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission. 
Order affirmed. 
Stewart, J., filed concurring opinion. 
Durham, J., filed concurring and dis-
senting opinion. 
See also Utah, 627 P.2d 71. 
1. Electricity <3=>11.5(1) 
Utah Public Service Commission had 
jurisdiction over parties to controversy be-
tween cooperative power association, which 
received financing from the Rural Electrifi-
cation Administration, obtained electric 
power from its own generation facilities in 
Utah and from other sources including gen-
eration facilities in Arizona, and which 
made wholesale sales of electric power to 
public utility distributing power at retail to 
Utah and Arizona consumers, and the pub-
lic utility, which was not a member of the 
cooperative association, concerning a re-
fund by association to public utility, whqse 
rates for payment of the sold electric pow-
er were tied to Utah power and light.com-
pany rate schedules, $fter the Federal En-
ergy Regulatory; Commission ordered a re-
duction of Utah power and Jight's whole-
sale rates and a refund based thereon. 
2. Electricity <s=*11.5(l) 
Utah Public Service Commission did 
not exceed its statutory authority in order-
ing Cooperative association, from whom 
public utility purchased Wholesale sales of 
electric power, to refund $161,568.90 to 
public utility, where rates charged by coop-
erative association for the wholesale sales 
df electric power were tied to rate sched-
ules of Utah power and light company and 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion had ordered a reduction in the Utah 
power and light wholesale rates and a re-
fund as a result of the reduction. U.C.A. 
1953, 54-4-1, 54-7-20. 
3. Public Utilities <s=>120 
Utah Public Service Commission may 
order reparation for charges made by a 
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